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People experience an unpleasant sensation when hearing a scratch on a board or
plate. The present research focuses on this aversive experience known in Spanish
as ‘grima’ with no equivalent term in English and German. We hypothesized that this
aversive experience constitutes a distinctive, separate emotional concept. In Study
1, we found that the affective meaning of ‘grima’ was closer to disgust than to
other emotion concepts. Thus, in Study 2 we explored the features of grima and
compared them with disgust. As grima was reported to be predominantly elicited
by certain auditory stimuli and associated with a distinctive physiological pattern,
Study 3 used direct measures of physiological arousal to test the assumption
of a distinctive pattern of physiological responses elicited by auditory stimuli of
grima and disgust, and found different effects on heart rate but not on skin
conductance. In Study 4, we hypothesized that only participants with an implementation
intention geared toward down-regulating grima would be able to successfully
weaken the grima- but not disgust- experience. Importantly, this effect was specific
as it held true for the grima-eliciting sounds only, but did not affect disgust-
related sounds. Finally, Study 5 found that English and German speakers lack a
single accessible linguistic label for the pattern of aversive reactions termed by
Spanish speaking individuals as ‘grima’, whereas the elicitors of other emotions
were accessible and accurately identified by German, English, as well as Spanish
speakers.
Keywords: disgust, grima, aversion, asco, implementation intentions
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HOTSPUR: Marry,
And I am glad of it with all my heart:
I had rather be a kitten and cry mew
Than one of these same metre ballad-mongers;
I had rather hear a brazen canstick turn’d,
Or a dry wheel grate on the axle-tree;
And that would set my teeth nothing on edge,
Nothing so much as mincing poetry:
’Tis like the forced gait of a shuﬄing nag.
Shakespeare (1596), Henry IV, Part I
INTRODUCTION
Shakespeare’s quotation of Henry IV graphically illustrates
that some auditory stimuli possess physical characteristics that
directly trigger aversive responses. Such is the case of screeching
or creaking (i.e., those high-pitched, shrill sounds like the noise
of a piece of chalk on a blackboard, a fork scratching a plate, or
the scraping of fingernails on a surface). These auditory stimuli
produce an aversive emotional reaction in ways that have not yet
been extensively characterized.
Whereas some Western languages, English for example, seem
to lack a specific term for this experience to high-pitched and
shrill sounds, Spanish speakers refer to it as ‘grima’1. This
peculiarity has allowed us to assess (a) the conceptual, behavioral,
and physiological features of this aversive experience, and (b) its
differences with respect to a term that also alludes to emotional
aversive reactions (i.e., ‘asco’ or ‘disgust’). As ‘asco’ was found
to have the closest affective meaning to ‘grima’ in a first study,
we aimed to show across four studies that the Spanish ‘grima’
is backed by a well-delimited everyday concept which alludes to
distinct physiological correlates, and requires specific regulatory
strategies different from those involved in the visual (e.g.,
Marzillier and Davey, 2005; Adolph and Pause, 2012; Sherman
et al., 2012), tactile, olfactory, or gustatory (e.g., Croy et al., 2013)
aversive experiences labeled as ‘disgust’ (‘asco’ in Spanish)2.
Many contemporary emotion approaches consider emotions
as being each qualitatively different from another. From this
point of view, universal basic emotions are associated with
specific physiological and behavioral correlates. Thus, each
emotion is a distinct member of the family of basic emotions.
In contrast, appraisal theories and psychological construction
models question or challenge the view of emotions as a limited
repertoire of discrete categories. According to appraisal theories
it is the evaluation (“appraisal”) of the environment which
1In order to clarify when we are speaking about a term of emotion versus the
conceptual category of the emotion we use italic characters when alluding to a
conceptual category or its features (e.g., vergüenza, shame), and apostrophes when
alluding to the term (e.g., ‘shame’). When we talk about an emotion in a general,
unspecific way we do not use special characters (e.g., shame).
2In some of the studies using auditory stimuli, the aversive experience, which is
a central element of the concept of disgust, is not produced directly, but through
the evocation of a visual stimulus typically categorized as disgust, which in turn
produces the aversive reaction. This meta-experience is for example induced by the
sound of a vomiting person (e.g., Croy et al., 2013; Seidel and Prinz, 2013). Some
theorists have suggested that such auditory stimuli may not evoke disgust directly,
but rather engage associative networks including other features of vomit, such as
its appearance and smell (Lang, 1979; Chapman and Anderson, 2012).
elicits and serves to differentiate between emotions (e.g., Scherer,
1999; Ellsworth and Scherer, 2003). Thus, different appraisals
are assumed to elicit different emotions (Roseman and Smith,
2001). Though appraisal theorists differ in their appreciation of
the number of appraisal patterns and thus of different emotional
states (Scherer, 2000), most accept a vast number of emotional
states (Ellsworth, 2013). The underlying assumption is that one
single situation can cause different emotions, as each situation
can be interpreted (i.e., appraised) in multiple ways depending
on the individual (Roseman and Smith, 2001). Similarly, different
circumstances can cause feeling one and the same emotion when
they are elicited by the same underlying appraisal pattern.
Psychological construction models (e.g., Russell, 2003)
endorse the concept of appraisal but challenge the view of
emotions as natural kinds. Psychological constructionism does
not conceive of emotions as unitary, objective phenomena with a
clear definition in terms of necessary and sufficient characteristics
(i.e., latent construct called ‘disgust’, ‘anger’, and so on), but as
a set of independent experiential, physiological, and behavioral
reactions (“emotional episode”; Russell, 2003, 2014) that can
occur simultaneously or in close temporal proximity in some
specific circumstances and may have causal relationships among
themselves. Thus, psychological constructionism approaches
emotions as entailing two related but independent phenomena:
on the one hand, the co-occurrence of the different objective
components of an emotional episode, and, on the other hand, the
cognitive categorization of this event. A key point in which basic
emotion approaches and psychological constructionism differ is
the assumption of relativity of the categories of emotions and the
existence of important differences in the way in which people
from different cultures classify emotional episodes into certain
emotion terms
Growing research supports consistently the assumption that
disgust may not be one unitary, homogeneous concept. Nabi
(2002), for example, has suggested that the lay meaning of
‘disgust’ encompasses not only disgust, but anger too, and thus
differs from the theoretical meaning of ‘disgust’. That the word
‘disgust’ can also refer to one type of disgust but not others
has been supported by Yoder et al. (2016) with respect to
facial expressions. They found that different types of disgust
elicitors such as death, animals, or hygiene were systematically
associated with different types of facial expressions (standard
disgust, sickness, and sadness in Study 1, plus anger in Study 2).
More specifically, the sick face was more often associated with
physical disgust than was the standard disgust face, while the
standard disgust face (or an anger face; Study 2) was primarily
associated with moral disgust.
The lack of homogeneity also has clear implications when
it comes to translating emotion concepts (overview by Russell,
1991; see also Mesquita and Frijda, 2011). A recent study by Han
et al. (2015) showed that English speakers use the word ‘disgust’
to refer to distaste, pathogen-containing substances, blood and
injury, inappropriate sexual events, and moral violations. In
contrast, Korean speakers use the translation of ‘disgust’ only
to refer to some of them (i.e., distaste, pathogen-containing
substances, as well as blood and injury), while the translation
equivalent in Malayalam does not refer to any of them. Thus,
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 2 February 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 131
fpsyg-08-00131 February 2, 2017 Time: 15:13 # 3
Schweiger Gallo et al. Grima
in line with Wierzbicka (1999), who stated that there might
not be translation equivalents of the word ‘disgust’ in other
languages, Han et al.’s (2015) results suggest that this happens
with the translation of ‘disgust’ into Malayalam. The same is
true for the Chinese equivalent of the term ‘disgust’: a lack of
adequate translation was found by Barger et al. (2010), and has
been recently supported by data from (Schweiger Gallo et al.,
unpublished manuscript), who found different internal structures
of the concept of disgust in Spain, Germany, the USA, China,
and Palestine. In sum, this lack of equivalence across languages
is consistent with the argument that the English word ‘disgust’
can refer to different emotional reactions.
As compared to those cases in which there are no equivalent
single words or concepts for some experiences, for example,
as in English for the German ‘Schadenfreude’ or the Japanese
‘itoshii’ (Russell, 1991), people in some cultures may rely on
different colloquial expressions to refer to a certain emotional
experience. In the present research, we suggest that this is the
case with the Spanish grima. In fact, though people in different
cultures share this experience when they hear, for example, a
scratch on a board or a plate, we suspect that not all of them
refer to it by using a single term. Support for our hypothesis is
provided by the only literature based on this experience, where
it is described as having teeth set on edge (Delin and Winefield,
1973, 1977), as well as by searching the Internet, where people
refer to it in English using expressions such as ‘it makes me
grue’, ‘ibby gibbies’, and so on; and in German as ‘einem den
Rücken eiskalt runterlaufen’ (’it gives someone the creeps’) and
‘Gänsehaut bekommen’ (goosebumps).
As Spanish speakers make common use of the word ‘grima’,
the reasons for analyzing this experience are manifold: first
of all, from a conceptual point of view, mapping its content
is expected to shed light onto its elicitors, as well as the
feelings, expressions, physiological and behavioral responses
associated with the experience. In addition, assessing the
content of grima also allows us to analyze its relationship with
respect to other emotional experiences. In fact, by specifically
comparing grima and disgust we can provide the first empirical
description of grima as compared to disgust. This is of
importance, as past studies assessing emotions, and specifically
disgust, might have been tapping features pertaining to the
experience of grima. Finally, the existence of a specific term
for this reaction raises a number of interesting theoretical
questions: is grima an emotional experience on its own or
a mere reflex reaction? One possible answer to this question
might be based on whether or not grima involves cognitive
processes. In fact, introducing a cognitive process such as
the down-regulation of an emotional experience would allow
for testing whether grima might better be regarded a mere
reflex reaction rather than an emotional experience per se.
Further questions include: does grima, as a form of aversive
reaction based on distinct sensorial input, also have some
distinct physiological or behavioral correlates? And does the
existence of the term lead Spanish speakers to perceive this
aversive experience differently, as compared to those speakers,
for example English speakers, who seem to lack an equivalent
term?
We take advantage of the Spanish term ‘grima’ to explore
the constitutive features of the concept behind this term;
a task that would be hard to accomplish by focusing on
those languages in which participants do not have a specific
term for this aversive reaction. In this regard, we hypothesize
that grima is a distinct emotional episode with most of its
components being probably universally shared. Thus, even
though grima is characterized in Spanish via a dedicated
term, it is probably also experienced in other cultures without
a cognitive representation for this experience. In order to
differentiate grima from other emotional experiences, we first
explore which concept of emotion has the closest affective
meaning with regard to grima (Study 1) and the content
universe of grima (Study 2). Furthermore, we analyze whether the
conceptual differentiation between grima and disgust observed
in Studies 1 and 2 is supported by a parallel differentiation
of physiological responses associated with the experience of
grima and disgust (Study 3). Since we assume that grima
constitutes a distinct, universally shared emotional experience,
we expect different physiological profiles in both heart rate
(HR) and skin conductance response (SCR). In Study 4, we
assess whether the differentiation between grima and disgust also
holds true when it comes to the differential regulation of one
of them (i.e., down-regulating grima, but not disgust). Since
a self-regulation strategy known as implementation intentions
(i.e., if-then plans) has been found in previous research to
be effective in down-regulating unpleasant emotions such as
disgust or fear (e.g., Schweiger Gallo et al., 2009), participants
in Study 4 are either assigned to a goal intention condition
or an implementation intention condition and asked not to
feel grima. Based on previous research on implementation
intentions, only implementation intention participants are
expected to be able to down-regulate their grima-experience,
as compared to goal intention participants. Further, we expect
implementation intention participants to selectively down-
regulate their experience to grima- but not disgust-sounds.
Finally, Study 5 tests whether the affective aversive reaction
evoked by high-pitched and squeaking noises is conceptually
assimilated to other aversive reactions in those languages lacking
a single accessible linguistic label to describe the aversive
experience of what is called ‘grima’ in Spanish. Based on the
observation that German and English speakers recur to a variety
of metaphorical descriptions to refer to this experience, we expect
only Spanish speakers to label the experience with a unique
term.
STUDY 1: DELINEATING ‘GRIMA’ FROM
OTHER EMOTION TERMS
In this Study, we aimed at delineating ‘grima’ from other emotion
terms in order to test which concept of emotion has the closest
affective similarity. Here, the so-called Affect Grid was deemed
as the ideal method to test the location of different emotional
experiences in an affective space described by the dimensions
of pleasure-displeasure and arousal-sleepiness (see Russell et al.,
1989).
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Materials and Methods
Participants
One hundred and sixteen Spanish undergraduates attending a
Spanish university contributed data during class. The average age
was 21.7 (SD = 2.44). Participants tacitly gave their consent by
completing and returning the questionnaire.
Materials and Procedure
We administered the Spanish adaptation of the Affect Grid
(Russell et al., 1989) developed by Ruiz-Belda (1995). In
order to familiarize participants with the Affect Grid,
they were asked to read carefully a set of instructions
that explained in detail the meaning of the different areas
and how to use the grid. Next, participants were asked
to rate disgust (‘asco’), fear (‘miedo’), sadness (‘tristeza’),
happiness (‘alegria’), grima and anger (‘ira’) along the two
orthogonal axes of the Affect Grid, with the x-axis representing
pleasure with values between 4 (maximum pleasure) and —4
(maximum displeasure) and the y-axis representing arousal
with values between 4 (highest arousal) and –4 (lowest
arousal).
Results
First of all, we calculated the Euclidean distance on the affective
space between grima and the other concepts of emotion, based
on the average ratings on the pleasure and arousal dimensions.
Results revealed that closest to grima was disgust (2.8), followed
by fear (3.1), anger (3.3), sadness (3.6), and happiness (6.8). Thus,
in a next step we computed within-samples t-tests, comparing
grima with fear, anger, sadness, happiness and disgust. Results
showed that grima and disgust differed significantly on both the
pleasure-displeasure (M = –2.37, SD = 1.27 and M = –3.16,
SD = 0.86; 95% CI [–1.03, –0.55]), t(114) = 6.59, p < 0.01,
d = 0.61, and the arousal-sleepiness dimensions (M = 0.50,
SD = 2.15 and M = 1.30, SD = 2.47; 95% CI [0.26, 1.32]),
t(114)= 2.96, p< 0.01, d= 0.28. The comparisons between grima
and anger (M = –2.35, SD = 1.28 and M = –2.70, SD = 1.61;
95% CI [0.00, 0.71]), t(114) = 2.01, p < 0.05, d = 0.19, sadness
(M = –2.35, SD = 1.29 and M = –2.88, SD = 1.25; 95% CI
[0.21, 0.84]), t(113) = 3.31, p < 0.01, d = 0.31, and happiness
(M = –2.35, SD = 1.28 and M = 3.35, SD = 1.09; 95% CI [-6.02,
-5.37]), t(114) = 35.04, p < 0.01, d = 3.50 were also significant
on the pleasure-displeasure dimensions, with the exception of
fear (M = -2.35, SD = 1.28 and M = –2.63, SD = 1.48; 95%
CI [–0.05, 0.61]), t(114) = 1.68, p = 0.1, d = 0.16, where the
difference was only marginally significant. With respect to the
arousal-sleepiness dimension, the comparisons between grima
and anger (M = 0.54, SD = 2.17 and M = 2.90, SD = 1.85;
95% CI [–2.82, –1.91]), t(114) = 10.26, p < 0.01, d = 0.96,
sadness (M = 0.55, SD = 2.17 and M = –1.29, SD = 2.55; 95%
CI [1.24, 2.45]), t(113) = 6.05, p < 0.01, d = 0.57, happiness
(M = 0.54, SD = 2.17 and M = 3.17, SD = 1.32; 95% CI
[–3.12, –2.15]), t(114) = 10.77, p < 0.01, d = 1.07 and fear
(M = 0.54, SD = 2.17 and M = 2.36, SD = 2.13; 95% CI [–
2.30, –1.34]), t(114) = 7.48, p < 0.01, d = 0.70 also reached
significance.
Discussion
Results showed that grima was evaluated as being less pleasant but
more arousing than disgust. Given that ‘grima’ and ‘disgust’ had
the closest affective meaning, we decided to compare grima and
disgust in the following studies. This comparison was expected to
shed more light on the contents and structure of grima, as well as
the differences and similarities between grima and disgust.
STUDY 2: CONTENT UNIVERSE OF
GRIMA
Taking advantage of the fact that Spanish speaking individuals
use the specific term ‘grima’ to refer to the respective aversive
reaction, we explored the everyday concept of grima in order
to collect its most prototypical features. Based on previous
prototype research (e.g., Russell and Fehr, 1994; Gregg et al.,
2008), we asked participants to generate features of the Spanish
concept of grima.
Materials and Methods
Participants
One hundred and fifty-five participants filled out a questionnaire
either in the classroom or individually. It was assured that for all
of the participants, Spanish was their native language, with the
exception of one participant whose native language was German,
although the participant lived in Spain for almost 33 years. As
three participants did not report any situation in which they
had experienced grima and one declared not having had the
experience, these four participants were excluded. The mean age
was 30 years (SD= 10.49).
Materials and Procedure
Participants were told that we were interested in grima.
Therefore, participants were first asked to define grima and then
to list as many situations or objects of grima as readily came
to their minds. They were asked to stop after about a minute
or 10 items. In addition, participants then reported on their
typical physical reactions when experiencing grima. At the end,
all participants were asked to answer demographic questions.
Results
Participants’ answers were coded by two independent raters
following the procedure by Fehr (1988). First of all, all linguistic
units (i.e., single units) were extracted from the responses of the
participants. These linguistic units represent separate features
(e.g., “negative stimulus for the nervous system, so much that
the stomach shrinks. It is related to the hearing and touch”
was divided into “negative stimulus for the nervous system,”
“stomach shrinks,” “related to the hearing,” and “related to the
touch.”) Different linguistic units were grouped if they were
grammatical variations of the same word, if they were modified
by adjectives, or very similar in their meaning. For example,
“noises and squeaking” was composed by linguistic units such as
“squeaking with a knife on a plate,” “knife squeaking on a plate,”
“fork scratching plates squeaking,” “high-pitched sound such as
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when the chalk squeaks on a blackboard,” “sound of a chalk on a
blackboard,” etc.
Only a negligible number of disagreements occurred as the
task required minimal interpretation from the coders. When the
coders did not agree, consensus was reached by discussion. We
only considered those features that were generated by at least 10%
of the participants.
The preliminary extraction yielded 418 linguistic units for
the definition of grima, which were grouped into 203 features.
Of these, 149 were idiosyncratic (i.e., mentioned by only
1 participant). The feature most frequently mentioned was
“unpleasant sensation," (35 participants) followed by “shivering”
(20 participants). The same number of participants (18)
pointed to “noises/sounds” and “sensation of repulsion.” The
final feature mentioned by 17 respondents was “sensation of
disgust.”
The preliminary extraction of linguistic units of typical
elicitors of grima yielded 497 linguistic units, which were grouped
into 101 groups of features. Of these, elicitors belonging to noises
and squeaking, such as the noise of chalk on a blackboard,
were mentioned by 80 participants, followed by scratching
or touching with fingernails, mentioned by 52 participants,
and scratching or touching of surfaces (mentioned by 40
participants). Importantly, 53%, 34% and 26% of the participants
mentioned these features, respectively, which points to their
typicality. The animals such as cockroaches or snakes were
also mentioned as typical elicitors of grima (40 participants),
followed by accidents and physical damage (33 participants),
sense of touch of objects, such as cotton (32 times), and
chewing and biting objects such as wool (22 participants).
Elicitors from the moral domain such as racism reached 21
mentions, followed by issues related to fingernails such as biting
fingernails (19 participants), fabrics such as cutting cotton,
smells such as the smell of vomit (both mentioned by 18
participants), and food, such as rotten food (mentioned by 16
participants).
The typical physical reactions of grima included 177 linguistic
units, which were sorted into 82 groups of features. Of these,
only shivering and goose bumps received a significant number
of mentions (72 and 51, respectively).
As participants mentioned disgust (‘asco’) when describing
grima, we also compared the typical features of grima with
those of disgust by asking eighty Spanish speaking individuals
between 16 and 56 years (mean age 25 years; SD = 8.54; 38%
males) to list as many situations or objects of disgust as came
readily to their mind as well as to report on their typical
physical reactions when experiencing disgust. With respect
to the features of disgust, 344 linguistic units were extracted
and grouped into 64 groups of features. Results showed that
the features related to grima (noises and squeaking, as well
as scratching or touching with fingernails and scratching or
touching of surfaces) were not mentioned. The same was true
for chewing and biting objects, fabrics and issues related to
fingernails. In contrast, the moral domain, smells, and animals
were mentioned by 78, 61, and 60 participants, while food,
accidents/physical damage, and the specific sense of touch of
objects were mentioned by 47, 15, and 2 participants, respectively.
Among the 106 reported typical physical reactions it was
shivering and goose bumps that were mentioned 9 and 6 times,
respectively. Finally, we compared the respective proportions
of typical features for grima and disgust and computed their
respective confidence intervals (see Table 1). Results revealed
significant differences for noises and squeaking, scratching or
touching with fingernails, scratching or touching of surfaces,
animals, sense of touch of objects, chewing and biting objects,
moral domain, fingernails, fabrics, food, and smells, with the
exception of accidents/physical damage. With regards to the
physical reactions, shivering and goose bumps also differed
significantly.
Discussion
Grima is predominantly generated by high-pitched and
squeaking noises. In fact, noises and squeaking, as well as
scratching or touching with fingernails and scratching or
touching of surfaces were exclusively mentioned as features of
grima. Thus, the most frequent features of grima referred to
either hearing (noise of chalk, 38%) or touching (scratching
or touching with fingernails, 29%; scratching or touching of
surfaces, 17%). In contrast, other stimuli such as accidents and
physical damage, rotten food or those pertaining to the moral
domain were both mentioned for grima and disgust (e.g., Haidt
et al., 1994; Rozin et al., 1999).
With respect to the features mentioned as examples of physical
reactions to grima, shivers and goose bumps constitute the most
typical features of grima. In all, grima includes distinctive features
related to auditory aversion, but also shares some features with
other forms of aversion typically related to disgust (e.g., physical
damage).
TABLE 1 | Comparisons of the respective proportions for grima features
and disgust features (Study 2).
Category z p LLCI ULCI Cohen’s h
Noises and squeaking 12.65 0.00 0.28 0.40 1.60
Scratching or touching
with fingernails
8.70 0.00 0.17 0.27 1.24
Scratching or touching
of surfaces
7.22 0.00 0.12 0.22 1.07
Animals 8.18 0.00 0.36 0.49 1.03
Accidents and physical
damage
0.46 0.32 0.15 0.26 0.06
Sense of touch of
objects
4.86 0.00 0.10 0.19 0.63
Chewing and biting
objects
4.98 0.00 0.06 0.13 0.77
Moral 25.48 0.00 0.36 0.48 2.07
Fingernails 4.58 0.00 0.05 0.12 0.72
Fabrics 4.44 0.00 0.04 0.11 0.70
Food 8.02 0.00 0.21 0.33 1.09
Smells 11.91 0.00 0.28 0.40 1.43
Shivering 6.53 0.00 0.28 0.41 0.82
Goose bumps 5.25 0.00 0.19 0.30 0.67
LLCI, lower level 95% confidence interval, ULCI, upper level 95% confidence
interval.
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STUDY 3: PHYSIOLOGICAL
CORRELATES OF GRIMA
In Study 2, participants reported different physical reactions as
typical features of grima as compared to disgust. Whether or not
this reported conceptual characterization is supported in terms
of a parallel differentiation of physiological responses elicited
by auditory elicitors of grima and disgust was the aim of Study
3. Moreover, we aimed at complementing the self-report data
from the previous study with indices of physiological arousal
during emotional episodes in order to obtain information about
processes outside the participants’ self-reports (Lang, 1980).
Therefore, we assessed the physiological activity changes in HR
and SCR during the presentation of the most typical elicitors of
grima: high-pitched, squalling sounds.
The engagement of defensive (and appetitive) physiological
systems has been reliably related to a transient increase in sweat
gland activity, thus often regarded as a measure of arousal (Lang
and Davis, 2006). With respect to the temporal changes of HR
in response to an external stimulus, the temporal changes often
show an initial phase of HR deceleration, interpreted as orienting
toward a novel and potentially threatening stimulus (Bradley,
2009). The subsequent HR acceleration is seen as indicating
readiness and preparation for action in response to the event, and
it increases with behavioral relevance of the stimulus (Moratti
et al., 2006). In the context of disgust, these measures have been
taken as indexing avoidance or rejection behavior (Vrana, 1993).
Therefore, we aimed at analyzing whether disgust and grima
show similar physiological profiles or if they vary in their access to
basic defensive and arousal systems and therefore show different
response profiles.
Materials and Method
Participants
Thirty-seven German and American college students participated
for class credits or a small financial bonus. The mean age was
24 years (SD= 2.9).
Stimuli and Design
A total of 29 stimuli were selected from the “International
Affective Digitized Sounds” (IADS; Bradley and Lang, 1999),
based on pleasure and arousal ratings. Eight stimuli were rated
as unpleasant and disgusting (i.e., eliciting disgust, such as
vomiting) and seven stimuli each were rated as pleasant (e.g.,
laughing), neutral (e.g., rain), and unpleasant (e.g., screaming),
respectively, with pleasant and unpleasant not being different in
emotional arousal. Because the IADS-system did not have specific
grima-stimuli, we added 8 high pitched, squalling sounds that
were indicated as eliciting grima by three independent Spanish
raters in a pilot study. This resulted in a total of 37 stimuli. All
stimuli were normalized to have unit energy (defined as the root
mean square across their total duration of 6 s).
Procedure
Following the procedure reported by Bradley and Lang (1999),
each trial began with the presentation of the message “Please
prepare yourself for the evaluation of the next sound.” Next, one
of the stimuli was presented together with a brief description
and participants rated their experienced feelings on the 9-point
valence and arousal scales in the paper and pencil version of
the “Self-Assessment Manikins” (Bradley and Lang, 2000). Rating
scores were averaged within each condition, for each participant,
resulting in mean ratings of hedonic valence and emotional
arousal for each of the 5 stimulus categories (i.e., grima, disgust,
pleasant, neutral, unpleasant).
Heart rate was measured from electrocardiogram recorded
with a BioPac bioamplifier using three disposable snap electrodes.
Sensors were placed at the medial left and right forearms,
and the electrocoardiogram was digitized at a rate of 200 Hz,
constrained by filters between 0.1 and 50 Hz. HR changes over
time were obtained by detecting R-waves using a Schmitt trigger
and converting inter-beat intervals into beats per minute (bpm)
values for 0.5 s bins, as proposed by Graham (1978). This
method uses weighting of the temporal distance of heartbeats
to a given time bin (here: 0.5 s) to yield a continuous
function of HR estimates for subsequent time bins. The mean
baseline (averaged across 2 s prior to sound onset) bpm
value was subtracted from the HR time series to result in a
waveform reflecting HR change from the pre-sound baseline over
time.
The SCR was simultaneously recorded using electrodes placed
adjacently on the hypothenar eminence of the left palmar surface
using standard 8 mm silver–silver chloride electrodes filled with
0.05-m NaCl paste. The signal was recorded with a BioPac skin
conductance coupler calibrated to detect activity in the range
of 0–40 micro-Siemens (µS). The amplitude of the SCR was
calculated in half-second bins and was scored as the peak change
value during the 6 s sound presentations with respect to a 1 s
pre-stimulus baseline. The minimum of the first 2 s after sound
onset was used as a measure of initial HR deceleration and the
maximum in the range between 3 and 6 s indexed the subsequent
acceleration phase.
Results
Skin conductance maxima, HR deceleration and acceleration,
hedonic valence, and emotional arousal ratings were entered into
separate ANOVAs with the factor of Stimulus Category (grima,
disgust, pleasant, neutral, unpleasant). Significant F-values were
followed up by examining differences between pleasant, neutral,
and unpleasant IADS stimuli using linear and quadratic contrasts
(trend tests), and planned contrasts (t-tests) between the stimuli
of grima and of disgust.
Self-ratings showed a pattern consistent with normative data:
pleasant (M = 5.31, SD = 1.43) and unpleasant (M = 5.18,
SD= 1.36) stimuli were associated with greater emotional arousal
ratings than neutral (M = 4.38, SD = 0.94) stimuli, resulting in
an overall effect of stimulus category, F(4,144) = 3.04, p = 0.02,
η2p = 0.08, and a quadratic trend for pleasant, neutral, and
unpleasant stimuli, F(1,36) = 12.81, p < 0.01, η2p = 0.26. Grima
(M = 5.16, SD = 1.47) and disgust (M = 5.14, SD = 1.30)
stimuli did not differ from each other, t < 1, or from emotionally
arousing stimuli from the IADS (pleasant and unpleasant; ts < 1).
Grima (M = 5.66, SD= 1.54) and disgust (M = 5.31, SD= 1.30)
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stimuli were also perceived to be of comparable unpleasantness
(t < 1.2), with a category effect in valence ratings, F(4,144)= 3.20,
p= 0.02, η2p = .08, reflecting the linear decrease of pleasure across
the three groups of means representing pleasant (M = 6.26,
SD = 1.06), neutral (M = 5.84, SD = 1.29), and unpleasant
(M = 5.36, SD = 1.29) stimuli, F(1,36) = 13.34, p < 0.01,
η2p = 0.27. Again, grima and disgust stimuli did not differ from
unpleasant stimuli, ts < 1.
Heart rate data showed a more complex picture (see
Figure 1, left panel), and a main effect of stimulus category,
F(4,144) = 3.27, p = 0.01, η2p = 0.08, indicating that greater
initial deceleration of the heart was associated with greater
unpleasantness across pleasant (M = –0.09, SD = 1.36), neutral
(M = –0.48, SD= 1.30), and unpleasant (M = –1.02, SD= 1.20)
stimuli, F(1,36) = 12.08, p < 0.01, η2p = 0.25. Notably, grima
(M = –0.16, SD = 1.56) stimuli did not follow this pattern and
showed less deceleration than disgust (M = –0.80, SD = 1.14;
95% CI [–1.31, 0.02]), t(36) = 1.96, p = 0.06, d = 0.47, as well as
unpleasant stimuli (95% CI [0.15, 1.57]), t(36) = 2.44, p = 0.02,
d = 0.61, being at the same level as pleasant and neutral stimuli
(ts < 1.1). Similarly, grima (M = 0.94, SD = 2.11) was different
from disgust (M = 0.06, SD = 1.56; 95% CI [–1.73, –0.03]),
t(36) = 2.10, p = 0.04, d = 0.47, in terms of the subsequent HR
acceleration, where again an overall effect of stimulus category
was observed, F(4,144) = 2.52, p = 0.04, η2p = 0.07. Grima
showed the greatest activation, exceeding neutral (M = –0.10,
SD = 1.29; 95% CI [–1.90, –0.17]), t(36) = 2.43, p = 0.02,
d = 0.59, but not pleasant (M = 0.52, SD= 1.70) and unpleasant
(M = 0.28, SD= 1.61) stimuli (ts < 1.8). A quadratic contrast for
the pleasant, neutral, and unpleasant stimuli replicated previous
work with these sounds (Bradley and Lang, 2000), F(1,36)= 4.25,
p= 0.05.
Skin conductance data evidenced a strong relationship with
emotional intensity (arousal), leading to a category main effect,
F(4,144) = 2.71, p = 0.03, η2p = 0.07, and SCR to grima
(M = 0.13, SD = 0.13) and disgust (M = 0.10, SD = 0.13,
t < 1.1) stimuli were at the same level as those evoked by
unpleasant (M = 0.12, SD = 0.15) and pleasant (M = 0.12,
SD = 0.16) stimuli (all ts < 1.1). The only condition with
significantly different SCRs was the neutral (M= 0.04, SD= 0.06)
stimuli condition, resulting in a quadratic trend when comparing
pleasant, neutral, and unpleasant categories, F(1,36) = 14.82,
p < 0.01, η2p = 0.92.
Discussion
Stimuli aiming to convey grima or disgust fall into the range
of unpleasant stimuli, evoking significant SCR increase and a
typical pattern of HR deceleration/acceleration. Our procedure
led to self-rating and reflex physiology results consistent with
earlier work using auditory stimuli (Bradley and Lang, 2000).
Importantly, grima and disgust showed significant differences
in HR changes, but did not differ in affective ratings and skin
conductance. This suggests that grima stimuli were as arousing
as high arousing pleasant, unpleasant, and disgust stimuli. The
specific defensive engagement (HR) characteristic of unpleasant
and disgust stimuli (i.e., strong HR deceleration consistent with
orienting) was not present with grima stimuli, which in contrast
were associated with greater HR acceleration, consistent with
less specific defensive orienting, but strong autonomous action
readiness.
STUDY 4: SELF-REGULATION OF GRIMA
VIA IMPLEMENTATION INTENTIONS
In a fourth study, we aimed at critically testing whether the
differentiation between grima and disgust would also hold
true when it comes to the regulation of one of them (e.g.,
downregulating grima, but not disgust). We devised a study based
on implementation intentions (Gollwitzer, 1999), which are if-
then plans that spell out when, where, and how a set goal has to be
put into action by linking a critical situation with a goal-directed
FIGURE 1 | Changes in heart rate (HR, left) and skin conductance response (SCR, right) during the presentation of disgust, grima, pleasant,
unpleasant, and neutral sounds (Study 3). HR changes are represented in beats per minute (bpm) in 0.5 s bins intervals, while the SCR was calibrated to detect
activity in the range of 0–40 micro-Siemens (µS). The time series cover the duration of the sound presentations and include a second prior to sound onset.
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behavior: “If situation x is encountered, then I will perform
behavior y!” Whereas mere goal intentions designate desired
end-states the individual feels committed to attain (“I intend to
reach z!”), implementation intentions refer to the realization of
the goal intention and create a commitment to respond to a
specified critical situation in a planned, goal-directed manner.
Thus, implementation intentions are formed in the service of goal
intentions.
Implementation intentions create a mental link between the
specified critical situation (“if-part”) and the intended goal-
oriented response (“then-part”). As a consequence, the mental
representation of the critical situation becomes activated and
is highly accessible (e.g., Parks-Stamm et al., 2007; Webb and
Sheeran, 2007). Forming such “if-then” links also establishes a
strong cue-behavior link (Webb and Sheeran, 2008), such that
the presence of the specified cue automatically elicits the linked
response (e.g., Bayer et al., 2009).
Implementation intentions have been consistently found
to help people achieve their goals in several domains, be it
promoting desired behaviors such as in the educational domain
(e.g., attaining learning goals; Stalbovs et al., 2015), in the
interpersonal domain (e.g., interest in sustained contact; Stern
and West, 2014), or health-related goals (e.g., reducing pregnancy
risk; Martin et al., 2011), and also help control unwanted
habitual responses (e.g., reducing speeding; Brewster et al., 2015).
They have also been shown to be effective for different kinds
of populations, such as low-income and racial/ethnic minority
populations (Greiner et al., 2014), as well as children with ADHD
(Gawrilow et al., 2013), and adolescents or older people (Hall
et al., 2014).
Though research on emotion regulation by implementation
intentions was still rather scarce in 2006, when the first
meta-analysis on the effects of implementation intentions was
published (Gollwitzer and Sheeran, 2006), its relevance has grown
considerably in the last years. Indeed, research has specifically
shown that implementations intentions are effective in down-
regulating emotional experiences such as disgust (e.g., Schweiger
Gallo et al., 2009; Miles et al., unpublished manuscript, Study 1),
fear (Schweiger Gallo and Gollwitzer, 2007; Schweiger Gallo et al.,
2009, Studies 2 and 3), or anxiety (Varley et al., 2011).
Building on these findings, we hypothesized that if grima
and disgust are two distinct emotional experiences, the emotion
regulation elicited by forming implementation intentions should
allow participants to down-regulate their grima-experience
independently of the emotional reactions to disgust-eliciting
sounds. Thus, if our assumption holds true, the specific
down-regulation of grima by implementation intentions would
confirm the existence of two distinct emotional experiences, as
suggested by our previous studies.
Materials and Method
Participants and Design
Forty-four Spanish college students (mean age = 22.56;
SD = 3.87) listened to a total of 14 pleasant and unpleasant
sounds from the IADS (Bradley and Lang, 1999), which were
selected based on pleasure and arousal ratings from the Spanish
adaptation by Fernández-Abascal et al. (2008). As the IADS-
system did not have specific emotion-evoking sounds, we added
ten sounds that had been judged as eliciting grima and disgust by
three independent raters. The valence and arousal ratings were
assessed by two different self-report Manikin scales (Bradley and
Lang, 1994).
Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions
and were told that they would be asked to rate their emotional
responses to each of the presented sounds. Participants in the
mere goal intention condition (control condition) were asked
to form the intention “I will not feel grima with the presented
sounds!” Implementation intention participants also formed this
goal and added the if-then plan: “And if I hear a grima-eliciting
sound, then I will ignore it!” Next, participants were handed
the paper and pencil version of the “Self-Assessment Manikins”
(Bradley and Lang, 2000), and were familiarized with a typical
trial, which began with the presentation of the message “Please
prepare yourself for the evaluation of the next sound.” One of the
sounds was then presented together with a short description of
how it originated, and participants were advised to indicate their
experienced feelings at the moment of hearing the sounds in less
than 5 s. All participants were then given a final questionnaire
that assessed how committed they felt to meeting the goal
of down-regulating grima, as well as participants’ perceived
performance. Both items were accompanied by 9-point answer
scales ranging from 1 (“not at all”) to 9 (“very”).
Results
Main Analyses
A 2 (self-regulation condition: goal intention condition,
implementation intention condition) X 4 (type of sounds:
pleasant, unpleasant, grima, disgust) ANOVA revealed no
significant interaction effect of type of sound and self-regulation
condition on valence, F(3,126) = 0.69, ns, nor on arousal
ratings, F(3,126) = 1.02, ns. Further analyses also revealed that a
one-factorial ANOVA on valence ratings (down-regulation: goal
intention vs. implementation intention) yielded no significant
self-regulation condition effects for the pleasant sounds, F < 1,
the unpleasant sounds, F(1,42) = 2.66, ns, or for the disgust
-eliciting sounds, F(1,42) = 1.54, ns. Importantly, there was a
marginally significant effect for the grima-sounds, F(1,42)= 3.96,
p = 0.053, d = 0.61, with implementation intention participants
rating the grima-sounds as less unpleasant than goal intention
participants (M = 6.54, SD = 1.11 and M = 7.22, SD = 1.13).
In line with our hypothesis, the one-way ANOVA for the
grima-eliciting sounds was also significant for the arousal
ratings, F(1,42) = 5.46, p = 0.02, d = 0.72. Specifically, grima-
sounds were rated as less arousing by implementation intention
participants than by goal intention participants (M = 4.99,
SD = 1.93 and M = 3.77, SD = 1.42). Likewise, no differences
between conditions were found for pleasant sounds and
disgust-eliciting sounds (Fs > 0.1), nor for unpleasant sounds,
F(1,42)= 1.21, ns.
Hence, only participants who furnished their goal intention to
not feel grima with a respective implementation intention
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rated the sounds as less unpleasant and less arousing
than goal intention participants. Importantly, this effect of
implementation intentions on valence and arousal ratings
only held true for the grima-eliciting sounds, but was not
observed for disgusting sounds (i.e., implementation intention
participants were able to differentially down-regulate the targeted
emotion).
Post-experimental Questionnaire
Goal intention and implementation intention participants did
not differ with respect to how committed they felt to their goal
intention (M = 7.20, SD= 1.77 and M = 6.67, SD= 2.04; 95% CI
[–0.01, 1.36]), how much they tried to achieve this goal intention
(M = 7.40, SD = 1.85 and M = 7.58, SD = 1.79; 95% CI [–1.29,
0.93]), how well they succeeded in realizing their goal intention
(M = 6.70, SD = 1.53 and M = 7.04, SD = 2.14; 95% CI [–0.01,
1.36]), or how much they visualized the instructions (M = 6.55,
SD = 2.04 and M = 5.83, SD = 2.71; 95% CI [–1.49, 0.81]),
all ts < 1. Thus, the observed effects are not based on a higher
commitment or a higher perceived performance.
Discussion
Further preliminary evidence for the differentiation between the
components of grima and disgust is provided in this study, where
participants formed either a goal intention or an implementation
intention to down-regulate their emotional reactions to grima-
eliciting sounds. Results showed that implementation intentions
that targeted grima only managed to affect participants’ grima-
related responses, but not the responses evoked by the other
pleasant and unpleasant sounds, including those evoking disgust.
As participants were able to selectively down-regulate grima, as
compared to disgust, this study also suggests that the experience
described by ‘grima’ is not a reflex in the sense of a fast and
inevitable response to specific stimuli (Konorski, 1948) but rather
points to a differentiation of grima and disgust as two distinct
emotional experiences.
One might be tempted to assume that implementation
intention participants reported having down-regulated their
emotional reactions because they received instructions to do
so. If this were true, both goal intention participants and
implementation intention participants should have reported
lower grima-feelings. However, participants in the goal intention
condition reported feeling grima, whereas participants in the
implementation intention condition did not. Still, one might
want to argue that implementation intention participants
experienced stronger experimenter demand as they are instructed
to down-regulate their grima-feelings by using implementation
intentions. In this regard, Schweiger Gallo et al. (2009) found
no differences in the experimenter demand experienced by
goal intention versus implementation intention participants
in their studies on the self-regulation of disgust and fear.
This suggests that the differences they observed between the
goal intention condition and the implementation intention
condition in down-regulating disgust and fear were due to the
higher self-regulatory effectiveness of implementation intentions
as compared to goal intentions, rather than on differential
experimenter demand.
STUDY 5: CROSS-CULTURAL
COMPARISON OF THE
CATEGORIZATION OF GRIMA
In Study 5, we asked whether the negative affective experience
caused by aversive sounds is sufficiently distinctive to be referred
to by using a unique term in other Western countries than in
Spain. As people seem refer to it in English and in German using
different expressions, we asked whether this would also hold true
when asked to characterize the elicitors of different emotions.
Thus, we utilized a procedure developed by Boucher and Brandt
(1981), aimed at testing cross-cultural similarities and differences
in the categorization of affective reactions. We expected coherent
descriptions of happiness, anger, fear, sadness, shame, guilt, and
disgust in English, German and Spanish, as well as of grima
in Spain, but no specific cross-cultural comparison of grima in
Germany and the USA.
Pilot Study
Forty-seven students from a US University, 54 Spanish
participants and 10 students from a German University
were asked to describe a situation which typically evokes
anger (ira, Ärger), disgust (asco, Ekel), fear (miedo, Angst),
happiness (alegria, Freude), sadness (tristeza, Traurigkeit), shame
(vergüenza, Scham), guilt (culpa, Schuld), and envy (envidia,
Neid). Two independent raters chose the three most characteristic
descriptions for each of them among all the answers.
Materials and Method
Participants and Design
One-hundred and sixteen German (mean age = 22.65;
SD = 5.62), 85 Spanish (mean age = 21.91; SD = 3.36),
and 99 US participants (mean age = 19.46; SD = 1.45) indicated
which emotion was evoked by the situations selected among
the descriptions obtained in the pilot study. We also included
three typical elicitors of the auditory aversive reaction of grima
previously identified in Study 1 (scraping fingernails on a
blackboard, the noise of a chalk on a blackboard, and an open
bone fracture). We relied on an open-ended response format
and instructed participants to write down which emotion was
evoked primarily (e.g., happiness or sadness) rather than how the
emotion was (e.g., unpleasant).
Results
American and German participants resorted to different
linguistic labels to refer to the aversive reaction evoked by
scraping fingernails on a blackboard and the noise of a chalk
on a blackboard (see Table 2). In fact, they labeled this
experience as ‘disgust’ and ‘Ekel’. In contrast, the elicitors of
other categories of emotions were accessible and accurately
identified, including disgust (e.g., unclean, clogged toilet was
identified by 93% of German participants; seeing someone vomit
was identified by 69 % of American participants), happiness
(e.g., spending time with friends was identified by 84% of
German participants and 78% of American participants), and
sadness (e.g., death of a beloved person was identified by 86%
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TABLE 2 | Percentage of features mentioned by at least 10% of the participants in Germany, the USA, and Spain for grima elicitors (Study 5).
Antecedent Term in Germany Term in the USA Term in Spain
Scraping fingernails on a blackboard ‘Ekel’ (41%), ‘Grausen’ (11%) ‘Annoyance’ (15%), ‘Anger’ (15%), ‘Irritation’ (15%) ‘Grima’ (66%)
Chalk on a blackboard ‘Ekel’ (40%), ‘Schauder’ (11%) ‘Annoyance’ (22%), ’Irritating’ (14%), ‘Discomfort’ (11%) ‘Grima’ (60%)
Seeing an open bone fracture. ‘Ekel’ (58%) ‘Disgust’ (46%) ‘Grima’ (38 %), ‘Asco’ (26 %)
‘Ekel’ is the common translation for ‘disgust’, whereas ‘Grausen’ can be translated as ‘horror’ and ‘Schauder’ as shudder or shiver.
of German participants; having to put their dog down was
identified by 73% of American participants). In the same vein,
Spanish speaking individuals’ characterization of the elicitors
of happiness, shame, or fear were also accurate (e.g., seeing
somebody you like and haven’t seen for a while, screwing things
up in front of a large group of people, and feeling that somebody
is following you on the street were identified by 87, 86, and
74% of Spanish participants, respectively). Importantly, however,
Spanish speaking individuals also distinguished between grima
and disgust (e.g., finding vomit on the floor was identified as
disgust by 89% of Spanish participants.)
Discussion
Study 5 points to an aversive experience which is reliably labeled
as ‘grima’ in Spanish. Importantly, in those languages in which
there is no specific term to characterize the aversive reaction to
stimuli associated to grima, this experience is described being
related to the term of ‘disgust’ (or ‘Ekel’ in our German sample)
along with other aversive reactions. Thus, both English and
German speakers bridge what seems to be a lexical gap by
using semantic neighbors. In contrast, ‘grima’ and ‘asco’ were
used to refer to different aversive reactions by Spanish speaking
individuals, with the exception of “seeing an open bone fracture”,
which was identified as disgust by English and German speakers,
but was characterized by Spanish speakers as eliciting grima, and,
to a lesser extent, disgust.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The present research has attempted to characterize the everyday
concept behind an aversive response, which is known in Spanish
as ‘grima’. Contributing to the literature on folk concepts and
their differences across languages, our studies point out that the
everyday concept of grima differs from disgust (Study 1), both
with respect to its typical elicitors and physiological concomitants
(Study 2). In line with these results, the findings of Study 3
show that the typical elicitors of grima have different effects on
HR. Study 4 provides further evidence for the conceptual and
experiential differentiation between grima and disgust. Extending
previous research, where the regulation of emotional reactions
by implementation intentions was based on visual stimuli
(for example, Schweiger Gallo et al., 2009), we used auditory
stimuli to show that participants who formed a grima-related
implementation intention were able to selectively down-regulate
their emotional experience to the grima-eliciting sounds.
Interestingly, German and US English speakers do not have
a comparable lexical analog for ‘grima’ (Study 5). In fact, grima
goes nameless in these languages. This is even more remarkable,
as closely related Indo-European languages such as English,
German and Spanish differ with regards to the linguistic label
used to refer to this aversive reaction. In fact, 11% of our German
sample used the term ‘Schauder’, which can be translated as
‘shudder’ or ‘shiver’, to refer to this experience. Though they do
not have a distinct term to refer to the experience, they seem to
recognize it and use the physiological concomitants to refer to its
corresponding affective reaction.
Implications
Our research is inspired by Russell (1991, p. 428), who stated:
“I take it for granted that psychologists are interested in the
emotions of all people, not just those who speak English”. By
focusing on an emotion concept which is present in a Western
culture, our studies complement and support the ethnographic
evidence reviewed by Russell mostly for non-Indo-European
languages. The importance of grima in the Spanish everyday
knowledge of emotion suggests that the English emotion lexicons
might not only fail to adequately represent the emotional life of
non-Western individuals (see Scollon et al., 2004), but also of
some Western individuals.
Is the aversive experience labeled as ‘grima’ a mere reflex
reaction? Reflexes are traditionally defined as simple, direct,
quick, and inevitable responses to specific eliciting stimuli
(Konorski, 1948). Many reflexes may also be characterized by
fixed, brief latencies and thus are considered not amenable
to voluntary suppression, although they can be modulated by
factors such as learning/experience and motivational state (Lang
et al., 1990). In line with research on emotion regulation by
implementation intentions (Webb et al., 2012), the findings of
Study 4 suggest that grima can be down-regulated by forming
implementation intentions and thus might not have to be
considered a reflex. Indirect support for the assumption that the
Spanish term ‘grima’ refers to an emotional experience rather
than a reflex can also be found in our second study, were grima
was reported to be elicited by different kinds of stimuli (not just
scratching or touching of surfaces). Grima is also more than a
set of bodily reactions as, for example, “the chills” are. “Chills”
have been characterized, for example, by Maruskin et al. (2012),
who found that this sensation is composed by goosetingles and
coldshivers. In contrast, grima includes a variety of elicitors
and the experience of grima seems to also involve cognitive
processes, as participants in the fourth study who formed an
implementation intention were able to down-regulate the grima
experience, but not the disgust experience. Even more so, the
appraisal of grima differed from the appraisal of disgust. Thus,
if we accept that emotions require cognitive appraisals, grima
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cannot be regarded as a mere reflex or a set of bodily responses.
These observations are also in line with data obtained when
we asked Spanish participants whether grima and disgust are
emotions: participants considered that grima was an emotion to
an even greater extent than disgust. Future research might want
to address these issues in more detail and further dig into the
characterization of grima.
Is grima a distinct emotion? There are various possible
answers to this question, depending on which of the different
approaches one adheres to. A first potential interpretation is that
the concept of grima is a natural kind which reflects the structure
of a universal basic emotion with its specific experiential,
physiological and behavioral constituents. In support of this view,
the results of Study 3 showed that participants who displayed
a differentiated physiological reaction to grima elicitors were
German students who, as shown in Study 5, lack a category
of emotion similar to grima and assimilate grima into other
categories of emotion such as disgust. From this perspective,
grima is just a member of one of the “families” of basic emotions
recently described for example by Ekman and Cordaro (2011)
or Levenson (2011). While this approach is intuitively simple,
it raises a number of objections. The most important problem,
from a theoretical point of view, is that it lacks parsimony. The
absence of a definitive list of basic emotions (Ortony and Turner,
1990) allows the basic-emotion theory to include all kinds of
variations and post-hoc sub-categories of basic emotions, in an
evolution that has manifest epistemic similarities with the drift
of the instinct theories at the beginning of the twentieth century.
Any undescribed emotional experience should be assimilated to a
basic emotion family, regardless of its differential characteristics.
A second, in our view more appropriate approach to our
findings is inspired by psychological construction models (for
example, Russell, 2003; Barrett, 2013), but is also compatible
with appraisal theory. Based on this approach, grima is a native
everyday concept of emotion alluding to a set of potentially
universal affective (e.g., core affect), cognitive (e.g., appraisals),
and behavioral processes (e.g., action tendencies). This set is
what, in terms of psychological constructionism, is called an
“emotional episode.” In some cases, these coincidental processes
are categorized, in terms of everyday language, as an emotion
with its corresponding term in that language. The existence of
the term probably enhances the extent of awareness about the
emotional experience in a sort of “soft version” of the Whorf
hypothesis, but the existence of an everyday concept is not a
necessary prerequisite for experiencing the emotional episode. If
there is no everyday concept, the emotional episode is not labeled
by the subject, or it is assimilated to the everyday concept of a
roughly similar experience (e.g., disgust, in the English-speaking
participants).
Limitations and Future Directions
An important concern, already addressed in other studies on
the everyday knowledge of emotions (see Russell, 1992; Hurtado
de Mendoza et al., 2010), is that our approach might miss the
objective definition of grima because it focuses on the potentially
accidental definition provided by the participants (i.e., their
everyday concept). We admit that the current approach does not
allow to determine all of the necessary and/or sufficient affective,
cognitive, and behavioral components that cause the experience
of grima. However, the isolation of the affective, cognitive, and
behavioral components requires, first of all, the description of the
everyday concept of grima. In this regard, the best descriptions
of everyday concepts of emotion are prototypical, probabilistic
representations The most typical features of the concept are
not necessarily the most important objective affective, cognitive,
or behavioral components of grima, but those that constitute
the subjective cognitive representation of grima, allowing for
distinguishing between those individuals who consistently report
grima and those who do not do so; a prerequisite for a
further objective description of the emotional episode behind the
everyday concept of grima.
Another important, and related limitation of our studies
is that they did not include a systematic causal test of the
elicitors of grima. In this respect, the most intriguing question
concerns the origin and function of this specific reaction to
certain sounds. A set of affective, physiological and behavioral
aversive reactions to some specific auditory stimuli is probably
shared by all humans. In fact, the existence of a form of auditory
aversion to specific sounds has received some attention from
neuroscience (e.g., Schönwiesner and Zatorre, 2008), as well
as from research with animals, for example with non-human
primates (McDermott and Hauser, 2004). The reasons underlying
the aversive experience evoked by scraping sounds remain
nevertheless to be researched (Cox, 2008). One possibility relates
to the potential adaptive benefits of this experience, as these
sounds might be associated with dangerous predators or objects,
and could thus serve to avoid the dangers derived from either of
them. However, the results of Study 3, where a heightened action
readiness but not defensive orientation was found, suggest a need
to get rid of the unpleasant experience, but not to flee from the
stimulus. These follow-up questions need to be analyzed within a
systematic program of research.
Why grima became a more salient emotional episode in
Spanish than in other languages is an unresolved question
in our studies. The etymological origins of ‘grima’ are not
clear; a potential origin in Old German is the term ‘grimm’
(‘horrible’) but this root does not explain the current meaning
of the term. Importantly, the linguistic label that identifies
this affective reaction (i.e., ‘grima’) as a unitary phenomenon
is only found in some languages or, at least, in Spanish. As
has been observed for other populations and emotion terms
such as Tahitian society, that lacks a term for sadness (Levi,
1984 in Russell, 1991), or the Rarámuri Indians, who lack a
word for guilt (Breugelmans and Poortinga, 2006), there is
dissociation between a shared underlying affect system and its
cultural representation. The role of culture and language on
human perception has received attention in recent years. For
instance, language has been found to play an important role
in color recognition and evaluative judgments (Roberson et al.,
2000), as well as smell (Wnuk and Majid, 2014). Indeed, recent
research on cross-modal associations of odor and color found
that language plays an important role in odor-color associations
(De Valk et al., 2016). Further, it has also been questioned
whether the categorization of human emotional facial expressions
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depends on the existence (or not) of linguistic labels. Whereas
it has been claimed by some researchers that facial expressions
are perceived categorically even if there are no lexical categories
which differentiate between anger and disgust (Sauter et al.,
2011), others have questioned the assumption that categorical
perception is entirely universal (e.g., Roberson et al., 2010).
Therefore, an intriguing sequel to the present research could
focus on the potential differences in the cognitive representation,
as well as the affective processing of the aversive experience of
grima through a comparison of speakers, with and without a
specific linguistic label for this experience. Another important
question deserving attention is whether the emotional episode
referred by the term ‘grima’ requires not only some specific
behavioral, experiential or physiological components but also the
mental representation of the emotional episode through a specific
conceptual category. However, addressing this question is beyond
the scope of this article.
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